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From a political to  
a politicised Commission? 
Steven Blockmans and Daniel Gros 
 
 
he Commission proposed by President-elect Ursula von der Leyen has been carefully 
calibrated to woo major parties in the European Parliament, member state governments 
and citizens alike.1 Announcing a “geopolitical Commission”, von der Leyen expects her 
restructured institution to be better equipped to tackle the global forces unleashed by a 
protectionist ‘America First’ policy and an increasingly assertive China. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether some of von der Leyen’s more controversial choices will balance themselves 
out in the first 100 days after the new Commission takes office on November 1st, or backfire 
further down the line. The latter, in particular, concerns the role of the Commission as an 
impartial guardian of the treaties. 
 
1  The proposed Commission is geographically balanced at the level of the vice-presidents and spans three 
generations (the youngest is 28, the oldest 72). It also has more women than ever (13 out of 27). The UK has not 
nominated a candidate Commissioner. If, however, an extension of the Article 50 withdrawal procedure beyond 
October 31st is decided upon by the European Council, then a British empty-chair policy would be contrary to 
European Council Decision 272 of 2013. Adopted to accommodate Irish concerns ahead of a second referendum 
to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, this Decision states that the number of Commissioners will be equal to the number of 
member states. The European Council could of course amend that decision to limit the number of seats in the 
college to 27.  
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Policy initiator 
The good news is that von der Leyen hits all the right notes in fitting the Commission out for 
future purpose.2 With an astute sense of the broader political landscape and keen strategic 
foresight, she has prioritised the big-ticket items of today and tomorrow: Brexit, climate change 
and the fourth industrial revolution. 
The nomination of Irishman Phil Hogan – a vocal opponent of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, 
now to return to the College as Trade Commissioner – sends a powerful signal that the Irish 
border issue will remain at the heart of any future EU-UK free trade negotiation. The prospect 
that he will be assisted by the new Director-General Sabine Weyand, until recently the right 
hand of Michel Barnier in the Article 50 task force, suggests continuity in the Commission’s firm 
grip on the Brexit file, as well as a strong stance on a future trade partnership with the US. 
Von der Leyen recycled ‘first’ Vice-President Frans Timmermans in the role of Executive Vice-
President responsible for implementing a ‘European Green Deal’ – her plan to turn Europe into 
“the world’s first climate-neutral continent” by 2050. As such, she is not only responding to a 
hot topic that has mobilised both young and old onto the streets. She is also signalling a 
leadership role for the European Union on a multilateral issue supported by France and 
abandoned by the Trump-led White House. 
On a par with ‘Spitzenfellow’ Timmermans, Margrethe Vestager finds herself back in the 
College in the bigger seat of Executive VP, responsible for preparing the EU for the digital age. 
Vestager is expected to pioneer an EU digital services act to regulate how the likes of Facebook 
and Twitter should police illegal content and combat hate speech. Combining this regulatory 
work with a strictly apolitical anti-trust attitude will be a tricky balancing act for the new 
Executive VP. Traditionally, the Commissioner for competition had no other responsibility that 
could interfere with the main task. Vestager might, however, face a conflict between her role 
as guardian of free and fair competition and her responsibility for the ‘digital age’. The mission 
letter from the president-elect states explicitly that she should “work on a new long-term 
strategy for Europe’s industrial future, working together with the Executive Vice-President for 
an Economy that Works for People” (Valdis Dombrovskis). At the same time, it is notable that 
von der Leyen has not caved in to pressure from big member states that EU competition rules 
be made subject to a political/security test. Instead, she opted for continuity by offering a 
second term to the “tax lady” (dixit Trump) to break up or prevent abusive dominance in big 
tech (cf. US), transport (cf. China) and other important markets. 
French concerns about the latter have nevertheless been somewhat mitigated by the 
appointment of Sylvie Goulard, a former MEP, briefly defence minister and staunch ally of 
President Macron, as Internal Market Commissioner. Entrusted with a heavy portfolio, Goulard 
will lead the work on industrial policy, promote the digital single market and be responsible for 
 
2 See the contributions of CEPS staff to S. Blockmans (ed.), “What Comes After the Last Chance Commission?” 
Policy Priorities for 2019-2024. 
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a new DG for ‘defence industry and space’. With a view to the creation of a European Defence 
Union by 2025, integration in this area is slow but nevertheless important to strengthen the 
strategic autonomy of the EU in an increasingly conflicted world. 
Guardian of the treaties? 
The promotion and the protection of the rule of law, a slow-burning crisis that goes to the heart 
of European solidarity and integration, falls to another pair: Didier Reynders (who unveiled the 
Belgian government’s plans in this area at the 2018 CEPS Ideas Lab) has been offered Vice-
President Vera Jourová’s former job as Commissioner responsible for justice. Jourová has been 
promoted to vice-president on an adjacent file, i.e. values and transparency, a topic that has 
landed the leader of her political party at home, Czech Prime Minister Babis, in hot water due 
to allegations of fraud concerning EU subsidies and conflicts of interest. It remains an open 
question whether Jouravá, who, despite her promotion will have to do without a fully-fledged 
directorate-general, will tackle such cases head on, whether in Visegrád countries or elsewhere. 
European Commissioners are expected to solemnly declare at the European Court of Justice 
that they will act independently, in the general interest, and that they will not accept 
instructions from any national government or any other entity (Art. 245 TFEU). While it may be 
easier to deliver European messages to compatriots, Commissioners dealing with their own 
countries will always face the suspicion that they are doing favours for former allies. In the 
same vein, it may be harder for the Polish Commissioner-designate Janusz Wojciechowski, 
responsible for agriculture, to wean his country’s farmers off EU subsidies. 
Similar concerns exist with Von der Leyen’s choice for the economy portfolio-holder, whose 
core competence is the enforcement of the fiscal rules. The Commissioner-designate, Paolo 
Gentiloni, is a former Italian prime minister and well-respected politician but has limited 
experience in finance or economics. He might have to struggle with a conflict of interest as a 
prominent member of the governing party of Italy – the one country that represents a constant 
source of friction due to its large debt level. He will therefore have to demonstrate his 
impartiality vis a vis his home country on this point. Moreover, he must work with Executive 
Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis. In the Juncker Commission the influence of Dombrovskis 
was limited as he did not have his own service and most decisions were made on political 
grounds by the president himself (or rather his cabinet). This time round, Dombrovskis will be 
able to rely on the support of DG FISMA, which gives him greater clout.  
Other choices are more controversial still. The suggestion that Viktor Orban’s former minister 
of justice would be the right person to persuade accession and other neighbouring countries 
to improve their track record on justice sector reform and the rule of law flies in the face of 
everything the Commission has said it stands for and sends a terrible message to genuine 
reformers in the Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership countries and the MENA region. Unless, 
of course, von der Leyen’s tactic is to neutralise Orban’s nomination in the European 
Parliament. While risky, there may indeed be no majority for this candidate who played a key 
role in dismantling democracy in Hungary.  
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Equally absurd, but less harmful, is the promotion of former Commission spokesperson 
Margaritas Schinas to the position of VP (no less), responsible for “protecting our European 
way of life”. Covering, inter alia, migration and security, it is hard to tell whether the description 
of this portfolio is influenced by political tendencies espoused by the far right or is simply a 
clumsy title unworthy of a former spokesperson. The addition of employment and education 
to the mandate suggests the latter: a coordinating role supported by the Secretariat-General 
of the Commission. The onerous migration dossier has in fact been entrusted to Commissioner 
Ylva Johansson, who will lead DG HOME. 
In a similar propagandist line of presentation, von der Leyen wishes her Commission to give “a 
new push for European democracy” (the accompanying tagline to the Commission’s new 
composition). While this sounds like a good idea for an institution that is often berated for being 
too remote, bureaucratic and out of touch, one wonders whether there is really much more 
the Commission can do to give the European citizen a stronger voice in policy initiation, let 
alone the EU decision-making process.3 
Leaving the confusing new labels aside (see also the Commissioner for ‘International 
Partnerships’, formerly development, and the one for ‘Crisis Management’, previously 
humanitarian aid), the risk of politicisation of the von der Leyen Commission is real and 
potentially more damaging. 
Political triumvirate 
With the creation of a triumvirate of ‘executive vice-presidents’, von der Leyen has inserted a 
new layer into the hierarchical structure of her Commission. Unlike four of their colleague VPs, 
the big three cumulate their position with that of line Commissioner, complete with their own 
directorate-general: Timmermans is supported by DG CLIMA, Vestager by DG COMP, and 
Dombrovskis by DG FISMA. The eighth VP, the designated High Representative Josep Borrell, is 
supported by the European External Action Service. The extent to which the second-tier VPs 
will be able to exert political power over the regular Commissioners will therefore be mainly 
determined by their savviness in operating within the Commission apparatus.  
Apart from the extra level of hierarchy in the College, political power in the new Commission 
seems to be further dispersed by the continuation, if not expansion, of Juncker’s use of clusters 
of Commissioners, tasked with cooperating on hot topics.  
Yet no file is expected to percolate up to the College without having been cleared by the 
triumvirate, which is a reflection of the deal brokered by the June European Council to 
empower the majority held by the Christian, social and liberal democratic parties in the newly 
formed European Parliament. As such, von der Leyen will basically import a German-style grand 
 
3 See in this respect the contributions to S. Blockmans and S. Russack (eds.) Direct Democracy in the EU: The Myth 
of a Citizens’ Union (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018) and S. Blockmans and S. Russack (eds.) Representative 
Democracy in the EU: Recovering Legitimacy (Rowman and Littlefield, 2019). 
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coalition political structure into the Commission. The presentation of the Commission speaks 
indeed of ‘a whole-of-government’ approach. However, the Commission is not, at least not yet, 
a government. It is a hybrid that combines two roles, that of policy initiator and, its traditional 
key task, that of independent guardian of the treaties. 
By installing a political triumvirate of executive VPs, the von der Leyen Commission is rendering 
intra-Commission decision-making, which has always been political, 4  more vulnerable to 
partisan influences, which risks further undermining the hybrid role the European Commission 
is expected to play. Interestingly, von der Leyen herself defines this Commission as a 
“geopolitical Commission” that supports the EU as a ‘guardian of multilateralism’. The omission 
of the ‘guardian of the treaties’ role is telling. 
 
4 See S. Russack, “Institutional Rebalancing: the ‘political’ Commission”, in Blockmans (ed.), op. cit., 7-19. 
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